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EMINENT DOMAIN - REMEDIES OF
PROPERTY OWNERS - STANDING TO SUE
Green St. Ass'n v. Daley, 373 F.2d 1 (7th Cit. 1967).
Civil rights and urban renewal are two contemporary topics of
controversy, and both are subjects of federal legislation which has
produced considerable activity in the courts and administrative agen-
des.' In Green St. Ass'n v. Daley,2 federal urban renewal and
housing legislation were merged in issue with the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 for the first time in a federal court'3
The plaintiffs,4 Negro owners and lessees of property located
within a renewal project area,5 sought declaratory and injunctive
relief against local and federal housing officials.' Ostensibly, the
project had for its purpose the redevelopment of a shopping center
and the construction of a mall, arcade, parking lot, streets, and by-
passes.' The project had been approved by the Chicago City Coun-
cil and the Housing and Home Finance Administration (HHFA).'
I Attention will be focused upon the following statutes: Housing Act of 1949, §§
105 (c), (d), 63 Stat. 417, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1455 (c), (d) (Supp. 1966);
Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 601-03, 78 Stat. 252, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to d-2 (1964).
2373 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1967), affirming 250 F. Supp. 139 (N.D. IL 1966).
8 In Thompson v. Housing Authority, 251 F. Supp. 121 (S.D. Fla. 1966), reported
after Green St. Ass'n, Civil Rights Act claims were made but not so identified. Accord,
Tate v. City of Eufaula, 165 F. Supp. 303 (MD. Ala. 1958).
4 The Green Street Association is an Illinois non-profit corporation organized by
residents of Chicago's Central Englewood area to protect their interests in the urban
renewal project. No issue was raised concerning the capacity of the association to bring
the action. Cf. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
5 The project area consisted of approximately seventy-five acres and was a section
of the three-thousand-acre Englewood Conservation Area. Within the project were
approximately three hundred buildings containing six hundred dwelling units. 373
F.2d at 3-4.
GThe district court held that the federal officials were protected by sovereign im-
munity and that the United States had not given its consent to be sued. Green St. As'n
v. Daley, 250 F. Supp. 139, 144 (N.D. Ill. 1966). The issue was not raised on appeal.
In FHA v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242 (1940), the Supreme Court held that since the National
Housing Act authorized the Federal Housing Administrator to sue or be sued, immu-
nity was waived and no other consent was necessary. The Housing Act of 1949, §
106(c) contains a similar provision. 63 Stat. 418, 42 U.S.C. § 1456 (c) (1964). In
Gart v. Cole, 166 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), af'd, 263 F.2d 244 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 978 (1959), the HHFA was held to be subject to suit in any district
in which it has an office or does business.
7 Although the Housing Act of 1949 was originally enacted to effect slum dear-
ance and achieve housing redevelopment, the statute was later amended to compre-
hensively attack urban decay. Housing Act of 1954, §§ 301-03, 68 Stat. 622-24, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1451 (Supp. 1966), amending Housing Act of 1949, § 101, 63
Stat. 414.
8 373 F.2d at 4.
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In the first count of their petition,9 the plaintiffs alleged a con-
spiracy to deprive them of their property' ° and that local officials
were induced to make use of their official powers to accomplish
Negro clearance." The plaintiffs relied upon Progress Dei. Corp.
v. Mitchell," which held that a real estate development corporation
was entitled to relief if it could show that the sole purpose of vil-
lage officials in instituting condemnation proceedings was to deny
the plaintiff equal protection of the laws. 3 The defendants urged
the court 4 to follow its decision in Harrison-Halsted Community
Group, Inc. v. HHFA.'5 In that case the plaintiffs sought judicial
review of an urban renewal plan to use property as a university site
rather than to commence rehabilitation of the area as was previ-
ously decided. The Harrison-Halsted court held that the plaintiffs
lacked standing because no private rights of the plaintiffs were in-
fringed and no substantial federal question was presented.'"
In considering the applicability of Progress,7 the Green St.
Ass'n court pointed to the allegations made in that case - that the
Deerfield officials were not acting to further a public purpose and
that they were acting solely to acquire the plaintiff's property in
violation of its right to do business.'8 The court reasoned that
Progress was construed to be essentially a civil rights case and that
the issue of eminent domain was only relevant in the context of
the denial of equal protection claims.'" Comparable allegations
9 In the district court the plaintiffs asserted five counts; however, two of them were
not raised on appeal: (1) that the project violated the purpose of the Housing Act of
1949; and (2) that it did not conform to state law requirements. Green St. Ass'n v.
Daley, 250 F. Supp. 139, 141-42 (N.D. Ill. 1966).
10 The area in dispute was occupied by an eighty-five percent Negro plurality. 373
F.2d at 4.
11 Jurisdiction was claimed under 28 U.S.C. S 1343 (1964); Civil Rights Act of
1871, 17 Stat. 13, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964); Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 601, 78 Stat.
252, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964).
12286 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1961).
18Id. at 231-32; see note 18 infra.
14 373 F.2d at 5.
'5 310 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1962), cart. denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963).
16Id. at 106.
'7 The court found Harrison-Halsted inapplicable insofar as the jurisdictional
claims were concerned. 373 F.2d at 5.
18 Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell, 286 F.2d 222, 226 (7th Cir. 1961). The em-
phasis that the court placed on its use of the word -solely" in Progress is deceiving It
appeared only once in the eleven-page opinion. Ibid.
19 373 F.2d at 5.
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were not made in Green St. Ass'n,2" and the court therefore found
Progress inapposite.2
It would appear, then, that a federal court will pass upon the
exercise of eminent domain prior to the commencement of condem-
nation proceedings where the complaint convincingly alleges facts
which demonstrate the absence of a public use or purpose and the
intent solely to deny the plaintiff some constitutional right." How-
ever, where the allegations manifest the presence of a strong public
purpose" and a competing denial of individual constitutional rights,
the federal court will not interfere,' for the state court is assumed
adequate to protect the plaintiffs federal constitutional rights' 5
After disposing of Progress, the court in Green St. Ass'n found
it necessary only to make a few cursory observations regarding emi-
nent domain to justify the affirmance of the district court's dismissal
of count one: " 'the power is deemed essential to the life of the
State' ; it is legislative in character;" only the actual, avowed
purpose will be examined and not the underlying motives;28 and
20 Id. at 6.21 Ibid. The case is therefore to be construed as essentially involving the power of
eminent domain.22 The court's position cannot be as inexorable as it appears. Certainly the federal
courts will avail themselves to a plaintiff, prior to condemnation proceedings, where
an irreparable injury in derogation of his constitutional rights would otherwise result.
Progress Dey. Corp. v. Mitchell, 286 F.2d 222,231-32 (7th Cir. 1961).2SThe district court in Green St. Ass', noted that if the plaintiffs were successful
in bringing this action, they would prevent the improvement of the Englewood area
and foster the segregated residential pattern in existence there. Green St. Ass'n v. Da-
ley, 250 F. Supp. 139, 147 (N.D. Ill. 1966).
24 A balancing process was apparently employed by the court to resolve these mat-
ters. If the public purpose weighs heavily, the court is prone to resist jurisdiction by
construing the complaint as involving the exercise of police power. The stronger the
assertion of a constitutional claim, the more it will mitigate against that construction.Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). However, the question arises
whether the higher the right stands in the constitutional hierarchy, the more likely it
will be found to prevail over other issues.
25 373 F.2d at 6-7, dting Baber v. Texas Uti. Co., 228 F.2d 665, 666 (5th Cir.
1956). In the state condemnation proceedings related to Progress, Deerfield Park Dist
v. Progress Dev. Corp., 22 IML 2d 132, 174 N.-2d 850 (1961), it was said: "If parks
are needed in Deerfield, and if the land so selected for them is appropriate for that pur-pose, the power of eminent domain cannot be made to depend upon the peculiar...
predilections of... the affected property owner." Id. at 140-41, 174 N.E.2d at 855.
20 373 F.2d at 6, citing Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472, 480 (1924).
27 373 F.2d at 6; see Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
28 Atlantic Coast Line tR. v. Town of Sebring, 12 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1926); City
of Chicago v. R. Zwick Co., 27 Il. 2d 128, 188 NY..2d 489, appeal dismissed sub nom.
Gonzalez v. City of Chicago, 373 U.S. 542 (1963); Deerfield Park Dist. v. Progress
Day. Corp., 22 IMI. 2d 132, 174 N.E.2d 850 (1961); accord, Berman v. Parker, 348U.S. 26 (1954); 11 MCQUILLIN, MtNIaaPAL CORPORATIONS § 32.25, at 321-22 (3d
ed. 1964). Whether the taking is for a public use or purpose is a question of law.
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the issue whether the declared purpose is "public" is to be decided
by the state court in condemnation proceedings.29
In count two of the complaint the plaintiffs alleged that they
were not permitted to call witnesses on their own behalf or to cross-
examine witnesses supporting the project but were restricted to read-
ing a prepared statement at the hearing before a committee of the
Chicago City Council?' This, they asserted, constituted a failure to
conform to the hearing requirements of the Housing Act of 1949"
and was a denial of due process. 2 In Harrison-Halsted the ade-
quacy of the hearing was also challenged, the argument being that
the Housing Act's silence was not intended to preclude review'
and that section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act34 provided
for such review. The court disagreed on the ground that section
10 confers standing upon those who have suffered an injury to their
private legal rights, as distinguished from injuries of a purely eco-
nomic nature, and therefore it provides no basis for judicial review
of an urban renewal program.35 The court in Green St. Ass'n
Berman v. Parker, supra note 27; Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 705 (1923);
Sears v. City of Akron, 246 U.S. 242, 251 (1918); Zurn v. City of Chicago, 389 Ill.
114, 59 N.E.2d 18 (1945); Limits Indus. R.R. v. American Spiral Pipe Works, 321
IMI. 101, 151 N.E. 567 (1926). But the necessity or expediency of the taking is a mat-
ter for the legislature to decide. Berman v. Parker, supra note 27; Rindge Co. v. Los
Angeles, supra at 709; Sears v. City of Akron, supra, Backus v. Fort St Union Depot,
169 U.S. 557, 568 (1898); Boom Co. v. Patters 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878); Zurn v. City
of Chicago, supra, Wilson v. City of Long Branch, 27 N.J. 360, 142 A.2d 837, cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 873 (1958); 11 McQUILLIN, op. cit. savpra, at 323.
2 9 Zurn v. City of Chicago, supra note 28.
30 373 F.2d at 7.
3 Housing Act of 1949, § 105 (d), 63 Stat. 417, 42 U.S.C. § 1455 (d) (1964):
"No land for any project to be assisted under this subchapter shall be acquired... ex-
cept after public hearing following notice of the date, time, place, and purpose of such
hearing."
In Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency, 317 F.2d 872 (9th Cit.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 915 (1963), the court, while holding that the plaintiffs had no standing under
the Housing Act of 1949 to enjoin the municipal agency from carrying out project
plans, noted that they nevertheless had an administrative channel for the assertion of
their grievances - by presentation to the HHFA administrator.
3 2 For purposes of jurisdiction the plaintiffs relied upon the Administrative pro-
cedure Act § 10, 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1964) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1964).
-3310 F.2d at 102. Contra, Administrative Procedure Act § 10(c), 60 Stat. 243
(1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(c) (1964): "Every agency action reviewable by statute and
every final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in any court shall
be subject to judicial review."
34 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1964).
35 373 F.2d at 7. This is to say that the plaintiffs have suffered no direct injury
distinguishable from the indefinite injury inflicted upon the general community.
Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); Gart v. Cole, 166 F. Supp. 128 (S.D.
N.Y. 1958), af 'd, 263 F.2d 244 (2d Cit.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 978 (1959). The in-
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adopted this reasoning in holding that the district court's dismissal
of count two was proper."
The Supreme Court has held that notice and a hearing are not
constitutionally required prior to condemnation proceedings"7
Thus, even if no hearing had been provided in Green St. Ass'n, the
plaintiffs would have lacked standing to object, for a hearing on a
legislative act is not essential to due process." Thus, a recipient of
federal funds need provide only a hearing in form to avoid friction
with the -HFA."9
Unfortunately, one consequence of the decision is that the
project-area resident is denied any effective voice in the urban re-
newal plan. If he attempts to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal
court to review the plan, he will be found to lack standing.4 ° If
jury must be to a legal right (as opposed to a purely economic one). Tennessee Elec.
Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939); Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464
(1938). Theories of contract have not provided the foundation of legal rights in ur-
ban renewal or eminent domain cases. "A condemnee has no legal interest in the
source of a condemnor's funds." City of Chicago v. R. Zwick Co., 27 III. 2d 128, 132,
188 NX.E2d 489, 491, appeal dismissed sub nom. Gonzalez v. City of Chicago, 373
U.S. 542 (1963); City of Chicago v. Sanitary Dist., 272 Il. 37, 111 N.E. 491 (1916);
Chicago Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Naperville, 169 IIl. 25, 48 N.E. 335
(1897).
"One who will be injured by another's lawful use of money has no standing to as-
sert that a third person's action in providing the money will be illegal." Allied-City
Wide, Inc. v. Cole, 230 F.2d 827, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1956), citing Alabama Power Co. v.
Ickes, supra at 480-81. The third party beneficiary doctrine has been argued, without
success, as a basis for standing. City of Chicago v. R. Zwick Co., supra, citing Harrison-
Halsted; Hunter v. City of New York, 121 N.Y.S.2d 841, 846 (Sup. Ct 1953); cf. I.
R. Moch Co. v. Rennsselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928) (no dis-
cernible intention to benefit individual members of the public).
SO The court further held that no substantial federal question of due process was
raised. See Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 709 (1923); Combs v. Illinois
State Toll Highway Comm'n, 128 F. Supp. 305 (N.D. IlL 1955).
37 Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472 (1924); Robinette v. Chicago Land
Clearance Comm'n, 115 F. Supp. 669, 673 (N.D. Ill. 1951); Ross v. Chicago Iand
Clearance Comm'n, 417 Ill. 377, 108 N.E.2d 776 (1952); Wilson v. City of Long
Branch, 27 N.J. 360, 142 A.2d 837, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 873 (1958); David Jeffrey
Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 267 Wis. 559, 66 N.W.2d 362 (1954). But see Hender-
short v. Rogers, 237 Mich. 338, 211 N.W. 905 (1927) (constitutional requirement).
Of course, due process does require notice and hearing for the purpose of fixing com-
pensation. Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956).
38 Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 708-09 (1923) (unanimous opinion);
Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57, 58 (1919). The delegation of legislative authority to
the municipality does not entitle landowners to a hearing prior to a determination of
necessity. Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, supra, Joslin Mfg. Co. v. City of Providence,
262 U.S. 668, 678 (1923); Sears v. City of Akron, 246 U.S. 242, 251 (1918).
39 Section 105(d) of the Housing Act of 1949, 63 Stat. 417, 42 U.S.C. § 1455 (d)
(1964) does not give individuals a statutory right to a hearing. Gart v. Cole, 166 F.
Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), aIff'd, 263 F.2d 244 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 978
(1959). Nor is it necessary that the hearing be held by the agency acquiring the land.
See Bowker v. City of Worcester, 334 Mass. 422, 136 N.E.2d 208 (1956).
4OE.g., Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency, 317 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
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he resorts to a state court, he will find that it does not have power
to review the action of the HHFA administrator.4 1  However, the
role of the resident in the urban renewal process may be a signifi-
cant one, and a better forum should be made available for the pres-
entation of his views.42 For this reason Congress should enact leg-
islation requiring the local planning commission to conduct public
hearings, early in the planning stage,4" suitable to the expression of
residents' views, and conducive to resident participation throughout
the planning process. Residents should also be able to compel full
disclosure of tentative project plans, to propose alternatives and
changes, to call witnesses and cross-examine adversaries, and to se-
cure representation on the commission.
In their final count the plaintiffs alleged that the relocation
provisions promulgated in the Central Englewood urban renewal
plan were not "feasible."" They maintained that the plan, by ex-
pressly acknowledging the segregated residential patterns in Chi-
cago and by providing separate relocation facilities for project dis-
placees based on race, violated section 601 of .the Civil Rights Act
of 1964."5 They also contended that the local and federal defend-
ants, in approving the plan, violated the plaintiffs' rights to equal
protection of the laws.46
Viewing the claims as against federal officials, the court rea-
soned that section 601" could not be divorced from sections 602
375 U.S. 915 (1963); Harrison-Halsted Community Group, Inc. v. HI-HIFA, 310 F.2d
99 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963); Allied-City Wide, Inc. v. Cole,
230 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1956). For suggested improvements in the judicial approach
to standing, see Jaffe, Standing To Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV.
L. REV. 1265 (1961).41 Hunter v. City of New York, 121 N.Y.S.2d 841 (Sup. Ct. 1953); cf. McClung
v. Silliman, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598 (1821) (state court may not subject federal officer
to mandamus). State courts have also held that the property owner has no standin&
E.g., In re Bunker Hill Urban Renewal Project 1 B, 61 Cal. 2d 21, 389 P.2d 538, 37
Cal. Rptr. 74 (1964); City of Chicago v. R. Zwick Co., 27 IMI. 2d 128, 188 N.B.2d
489, appeal dismissed sub -nom. Gonzalez v. City of Chicago, 373 U.S. 542 (1963) (con-
demnation correlative to Harrison-Halsted).42 This is especially true when a rehabilitation program is involved. The Cleve-
land PATH committee recommends an active citizen role. PATH REPORT 20 (1967).
43 Frequently, hearings are provided after the plan has so progressed that changes
would not be practical. Thus, the hearing becomes an ineffective medium for resi-
dent expression. See Note, 72 HARv. L. REV. 504, 514 (1959).
44 373 F.2d at 7, citing to Housing Act of 1949, § 105 (c), 63 Stat. 417, as amended,
42 U.S.C. 5 1455 (c) (Supp. 1966).
45 78 Stat. 252, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964).46 The court held that plaintiffs did not have standing to attack the plan under the
Housing Act provisions. 373 F.2d at 8, citing Harrison-Halsted Community Group,
Inc. v. HHFA, 310 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963); accord,
Barnes v. City of Gadsden, 268 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1959).
47 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 5 601, 78 Star. 252, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964) reads:
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and 6038 Construed together, the three sections declare a na-
tional policy,"o provide the agency with a procedure for implement-
ing that policy,5" and secure judicial review in favor of a recipient
aggrieved by a denial of agency funds for its violation." If indi-
viduals were able to sue for an injunction against HHFA officials,
the congressionally prescribed administrative procedure would be
circumvented.C 2
In asserting their claim against the local defendants, the plain-
tiffs placed emphasis upon the recent decision of Bossier Parish
School Bd. v. Lemon." In Lemon, Negro Air Force personnel
brought an action for relief from the local school board's refusal to
permit their children to attend integrated schools which were re-
ceiving federal funds. The court held that in the absence of a pro-
cedure through which individuals protected under section 601 could
defend their rights, judicial action was justified.' Although the
court in Green St. Ass'n did not yield to the Lemon rationale, it
assumed its correctness arguendo"5 and affirmed the district court's
dismissal of the action on the ground that mere recognition or ac-
knowledgement of segregation does not constitute state action."6
'"o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin
... be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal fi-
nancial assistance."
4 8 Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 602, 603, 78 Star. 252-53, 253, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000d-1, d-2 (1964).
49The plaintiffs construed § 601 as "implicitly" conferring standing upon them
as ultimate beneficiaries under the act. 373 F.2d at 8; accord, Bossier Parish School Bd.
v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1967); cf. J. L Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426
(1964). The district court in Green St. Ass'n thought that § 601 was intended to pro-
tect recipients of federal funds. Green St. Ass'n v. Daley, 250 F. Supp. 139, 146 (N.D.
II 1966).
50 Section 602 empowers federal agencies to terminate or refuse federal funds or to
resort to "any other means authorized by law" to effect compliance with § 601, pro-
vided that the agency has informed the persons affected of their noncompliance and
has determined that compliance will not voluntarily be achieved. 78 Stat. 252-53, 42
U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1964). In a case of termination of or refusal to grant funds, agency
action will not become effective until thirty days after a report is filed with the appro-
priate congressional committees. Ibid.
51 Section 603 expressly deems agency action under title V reviewable. See Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act 5 10(c), 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1964).
52 373 F.2d at 9. But see Bossier Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847, 852
(5th Cir. 1967).
58 370 F2d 847 (5th Cir. 1967).
54 Id. at 852.
55 373 F.2d at 9.
56 Ibid.; accord, Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963). If use of the
relocation facilities by displacees were compulsory, then an analogy could be drawn to
the school cases. Wright, Public School Desegregation: Legal Remedies for De Facto
Segregation, 16 W. REs. L REv. 478, 488 (1965). Strictly construed, the holding in
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Further, the local defendants exercised no control over the existing
segregated residential patterns."
Whether the Lemon reasoning will ultimately be applied to ur-
ban renewal cases is questionable." Given the grounds in Green
St. Ass'n for the conclusion that a judicially cognizable claim was
not stated, it is submitted that the complaint would be elevated from
statutory to constitutional dimensions and would be construed "as
essentially involving civil rights rather than as raising specific ques-
tions relating to eminent domain."59  Relief would then not require
reliance upon section 601.
ALAN B. GEORGE
Lemon was premised upon the violation of a constitutional rather than a statutory right
370 F.2d at 852.
57 The absence of any control over segregation distinguishes Sirnkins v. Moses I.
Cone Mem. Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
In Simkins it was held to be a violation of the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment for a private hospital receiving federal assistance (Hill-Burton funds) to "tolerate"
separate-but-equal facilities. Obviously, the hospital administration could prohibit the
discriminatory practices. In Rackley v. Board of Trustees of Orangeburg Regional
Hosp., 238 F. Supp. 512 (E.D.S.C. 1965), § 601 was held violated by the maintenance
of separate facilities in a private hospital receiving federal funds. However, the
Rackley court found prohibited state action, and it may fairly be said that the real sig-
nificance of federal funds in Rackley, as in Simkins, was its use as a vehicle to find
sufficient state involvement in the private institution so as to bring to within the four-
teenth amendment's prohibitions. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S.
715 (1961). Allegations that the situs chosen for a housing project fosters discrimi-
nation may raise a fourteenth amendment issue, but the evidentiary burden to overcome
the presumption that officials have acted in good faith is great. E.g., Thompson v.
Housing Authority, 251 F. Supp. 121 (S.D.Fla. 1966).
58 See note 56 supra.
59 373 F.2d at 5.
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